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Abstract
Government procurement contracts are frequently subject to policies that specify a subcontracting
requirement for the utilization of historically disadvantaged firms. I study how such subcontracting
policies affect procurement auctions using data from New Mexico’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
Program. Theoretically, subcontracting requirements reduce prime contractors’ private information on
their costs by requiring them to select their subcontractors from a common pool of disadvantaged firms.
This feature mitigates cost increases form using more costly subcontractors by causing prime contractors
to strategically lower their markups. My estimated model reveals that New Mexico’s past subcontracting
requirements led to minor increases in procurement costs.
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1 Introduction
Public procurement is a sizable part of US government spending. In 2013, public procurement amounted to
26.1 percent of US government spending and just over 10 percent of US GDP.1 The government awards a
portion of that spending to firms that, because of either size or past practices of discrimination, it considers
to be disadvantaged. In 2013, the US federal government awarded 23.4 percent of its procurement spending
to small businesses and 8.61 percent of its procurement spending to small businesses owned and controlled
by ethnic minorities and women.2 To obtain these levels of participation, the US regularly establishes
subcontracting requirements on its federal procurement projects, which specify a percentage of the total
award amount that should be given to preferred firms. For example, if a contract valued at $100, 000 has a
5 percent subcontracting requirement, then $5, 000 of that award must go to preferred firms. In this paper,
I study how these subcontracting policies affect procurement outcomes.
A key feature of subcontracting requirements is that they require prime contractors to complete more of
their projects with subcontractors from a common set of disadvantaged firms. I use a procurement auction
model with endogenous subcontracting to show that this feature can mitigate cost increases associated with
using more costly subcontractors. In the model, prime contractors can complete projects by using a mix of
private resources and subcontractors from a shared pool of disadvantaged firms. I derive a prime contractor’s
bid in this environment as a strategic markup over its project costs, where the markup increases as prime
contractors use more of their own private resources. With subcontracting requirements, prime contractors
use less of their private resources and more disadvantaged subcontractors, which lowers the amount of private
information prime contractors have on their own project costs. Prime contractors, therefore, reduce their
markups in their bids. The main finding in my paper is that the reduction in markups can be sufficiently
high to leave the cost of procurement virtually unchanged, even if the additional subcontracting increases
project costs.
I estimate an empirical version of the model with administrative highway procurement auction data from
the New Mexico Department of Transportation (NMDOT) in order to evaluate their Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise (DBE) Program. Although I focus on this particular program in New Mexico, my theoretical
and empirical framework applies to many other environments – including, for example, procurement with
small business and veteran subcontracting requirements. Like many other states in the U.S., New Mexico’s
DBE program relies on subcontracting requirements to increase the representation of small businesses owned
1See the OECD’s Government at a Glance 2015 report for more information on other countries.
2For a full breakdown of small business spending across federal departments, see the FY 2013 Small Business Goaling Report
using the following website: https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng cms/index.php/en/reports/63-small-business-goaling-report.html.
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and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals – who are primarily ethnic minorities
and women – on federal procurement projects. I find that New Mexico’s past subcontracting requirements
are responsible for a 12.7 percent increase in the amount of money awarded to DBE subcontractors yet
only increased procurement costs by 0.3 percent. These results suggest that New Mexico’s subcontracting
requirements were not responsible for large increases in procurement costs.
I then use the model to compare subcontracting requirements with two alternative policies geared towards
increasing DBE participation: a quota and a subsidy. I implement the quota by removing prime contractors’
rights to subcontract below the DBE subcontracting requirement, which is currently possible under New
Mexico’s program; I design the subsidy as a payment from the NMDOT to prime contractors proportional to
their DBE utilization. My analysis of these two policies reveals that New Mexico can achieve the same level of
DBE participation at even lower costs of procurement with subsidies relative to subcontracting requirements
and quotas. This outcome is a consequence of subsidies distorting the subcontracting decisions of low project
cost prime contractors less than the other policies. At the level of DBE participation achieved under New
Mexico’s current subcontracting requirements, quotas result in larger amounts of money awarded to DBE
subcontractors relative to the other policies. These results imply that quotas are best for governments seeking
to increase DBE awards, while subsidies are best for governments aiming to reduce procurement costs.
My paper fits into the literature on subcontracting and how it affects firms and auction outcomes. Jeziorski
and Krasnokutskaya (2016) study subcontracting in a dynamic procurement auction, and their model is
closely related to the model in my paper. The main difference between their model and mine is that I study
how different subcontracting policies affect bidding and DBE subcontracting in a static setting. These policies
are frequently used in government procurement and can lead to a variety of different procurement outcomes.
Additionally, their empirical application relies on calibrated parameters, whereas my empirical model allows
me to identify and estimate all of its primitives. Other studies of subcontracting include Marion (2015) who
looks at the effect of horizontal subcontracting on firm bidding strategies, Miller (2014) who explores the effect
of incomplete contracts on subcontracting in public procurement, Nakabayashi and Watanabe (2010) who
use laboratory experiments to investigate subcontract auctions, Branzoli and Decarolis (2015) who study
how different auction formats affect entry and subcontracting choices, Moretti and Valbonesi (2012) who
use Italian data to determine the effects of subcontracting by choice as opposed to subcontracting by law,
and De Silva et al. (2016) who study how subcontracting affects the survival of firms competing for road
construction projects.
There are additional papers within the subcontracting literature that focus on the relationship between
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prime contractors and their subcontractors and suppliers. In construction, Gil and Marion (2013) study
how the relationships between prime contractors and their subcontractors shape firm entry and pricing
decisions. Papers in other industries include Kellogg (2011), Masten (1984), and Joskow (1987). My paper
abstracts away from many of these more dynamic relationship issues and focuses on a firm’s static incentive
to subcontract with disadvantaged firms.
My paper’s empirical application to DBE subcontracting requirements complements the literature on
subcontracting-based affirmative action policies in government procurement. De Silva et al. (2012) also
study DBE subcontracting requirements and find that DBE subcontracting requirements have negligible
effects on a firm’s cost of completing asphalt projects in Texas. I extend their work by considering how prime
contractors allocate shares of a project to DBE subcontractors and how subcontracting requirements alter
those decisions. Marion (2009, 2017) uses changes in DBE procurement policies to identify the effects of
DBE programs on outcomes such as procurement costs and DBE utilization. My approach differs in that
I use a model to back out a firm’s cost components. The estimated cost components allow me to compare
outcomes across a broad range of counterfactual subcontracting policies. Additional studies on the effects
of these affirmative action policies include De Silva et al. (2015) who find that affirmative action programs
can generate substantial savings for the government and Marion (2011) who studies the effects of affirmative
action programs on DBE utilization in California.
There are a variety of recent studies on similar preference programs in government procurement. Athey
et al. (2013) study set-asides and subsidies for small businesses in US Forest Service timber auctions. They
find that set-asides reduce efficiency and that a subsidy to small businesses is a more effective way to achieve
distributional objectives. My results on quotas and subsidies for disadvantaged subcontractors are similar in
that I find that subsidies are generally less costly for the government relative to quotas. Nakabayashi (2013)
investigates set-asides for small and medium enterprises in Japanese public construction projects and finds
that enough of these smaller enterprises would exit the procurement market in the absence of set-asides to
increase the overall cost of procurement. Empirical papers on bid discounting, which is yet another type of
preference program, include Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) and Marion (2007) who study a bid discount
program for small businesses in California and Rosa (2016) who investigates bid discounts for residents in New
Mexico. Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) use numerical simulations to explore how discounts affect equilibrium
bidding.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the NMDOT’s procurement process
and DBE Program. Section 3 shows how I model bidding and DBE subcontracting, and section 4 contains
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a numerical example from my model. Section 5 shows how I estimate an empirical version of the model,
while section 6 contains my descriptive analysis and estimation results. Section 7 presents my counterfactual
simulations; section 8 concludes.
2 New Mexico Highway Procurement
This section describes how the NMDOT awards its construction projects, how the NMDOT’s current DBE
Program operates, and how prime contractors solicit goods and services from DBE subcontractors. The
contents of this section provide the institutional details that guide my modeling choices in later sections.
2.1 Letting
The NMDOT advertises new construction projects four weeks prior to the date of bid opening. As part of
the advertising process, the NMDOT summarizes each project’s main requirements in an Invitation for Bids
(IFB) document. This document contains information on each project’s type of work, location, completion
deadline, DBE subcontracting requirements (if applicable), and licensing requirements. I use the information
in the IFB documents to construct my set of project-level observables.
Interested firms then request the full set of contract documents from the NMDOT and write a proposal
for the completion of each project. The contract proposals contain a plan for completing the required work,
which includes a list of all firms used as subcontractors and a price for completing each required task. I use
data compiled by the NMDOT from the contract documents on the winning firm’s DBE subcontractors to
calculate the share of work allocated to DBE firms.
Firms submit their proposals to the NMDOT through a secure website prior to the date of bid opening.
On the date of bid opening, the NMDOT evaluates all proposals and selects the firm that offers the lowest
total price on all tasks as the winner.3 I model this selection process as a first-price, sealed-bid procurement
auction. The NMDOT also publishes an engineer-estimated cost of the project on the date of bid opening,
which I refer to as the project’s engineer’s estimate. This estimate corresponds to the amount the NMDOT
considers fair and reasonable for the required work and is typically based on historic bid data. In line with
the procurement auction literature, I use the engineer’s estimate as a proxy for project size.
3The NMDOT can reject the lowest bid if the lowest bidding firm fails to meet DBE subcontracting requirements or quality
standards. For a more detailed description of the circumstances where the NMDOT will reject a low bid, see the NMDOT’s
Consultant Services Procedures Manual available at http://dot.state.nm.us/en/Program Management.html.
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2.2 DBE Certification and Subcontracting Requirements
To qualify as a DBE, a firm must show the NMDOT that it is a small business owned and controlled
by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, who are primarily ethnic minorities and women.
Ownership requires that at least 51 percent of the firm be owned by these disadvantaged individuals, while
control generally requires that disadvantaged individuals have the power to influence the firm’s choices.
The Small Business Administration, which is the federal agency that supports and manages small business
programs, determines whether a firm qualifies as a small business in a particular industry by considering
economic characteristics such as the size of the firm relative to the industry’s average firm size. As part
of the certification process, the NMDOT visits the offices and job sites of DBE applicants to verify their
information. The NMDOT will also routinely check certified DBEs to ensure that they meet the eligibility
requirements. Firms that attempt to participate in the DBE Program based on false information can be
subject to administrative fines and suspension from federal contracting. There are a total of 235 qualified
DBE firms as of April 2016.4
As a recipient of federal funds, the NMDOT is also required to set an overall state goal for the utilization
of qualified DBE firms on federally assisted construction contracts. The state expresses its DBE utilization
goal as a percentage of total federal funds it awards to DBE firms and has historically been between 7 and
9 percent. If the NMDOT suspects that DBE utilization will fall short of the overall state goal due to either
unanticipated levels of contracts, unforeseen types of contracts, or corrigible deficiencies in the utilization of
DBE firms, the NMDOT can set subcontracting requirements on individual projects, which, similar to the
state goal, requires that prime contractors allocate a pre-specified percentage of the total award amount to
DBE subcontractors.
In setting these requirements on individual contracts, the NMDOT takes a number of factors into con-
sideration. In particular, the NMDOT bases their DBE subcontracting requirements on the type of work
involved on a project, the project’s location, and the availability of DBE subcontractors to perform the type
of work requested on a project. Additionally, the NMDOT will only consider projects with both subcontract-
ing opportunities and estimated costs of more than $300, 000 eligible for DBE subcontracting requirements.
Since those projects are the only ones eligible for subcontracting requirements, much of my empirical and
counterfactual analysis focuses on those larger projects.
Once established, the NMDOT gives prime contractors a number of incentives to meet a project’s sub-
contracting requirement. Although the requirement is not a binding quota, contractors who fall short of the
4For additional information on the NMDOT’s DBE Program, see the DBE Program Manual available at
http://dot.state.nm.us/en/OEOP.html#c.
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requirement incur additional costs in the form of showing satisfactory effort to use DBE subcontractors to
the NMDOT. Moreover, a prime contractor that fails to meet a project’s requirement can be fined according
to the difference between the established goal and the achieved level of DBE participation. I model these
costs as fines paid by prime contractors who miss the subcontracting requirement.
2.3 Subcontracting with DBE Firms
New Mexico maintains an online DBE system that is accessible to all governments and contractors. Through
this system, prime contractors can find potential DBE subcontractors and request competitive quotes for each
part of a project that requires subcontracting. DBE firms selected as subcontractors have the value of their
services count towards the subcontracting requirement provided that they are performing a commercially
useful function. Given that the DBE system is accessible to all governments and contractors, it is likely that
there are similarities in the cost of using DBE subcontractors across firms.
In the model, I represent the cost of using DBE subcontractors with an upward-sloping supply function
common to all prime contractors. Unfortunately, the New Mexico data does not keep track of the subcon-
tractors used by bidders who do not win, so I cannot directly test whether DBE subcontractor utilization is
common with the data. In other states that have similar DBE systems and that keep public records of DBE
commitments on projects with subcontracting requirements, bidders rarely use different firms in satisfying the
DBE subcontracting requirement. In a sample of lettings from Iowa, for example, 82.4 percent of lettings with
subcontracting requirements and more than one bid had overlap in DBE subcontractors.5 The advantage of
using New Mexico over these states is that I also have data on DBE commitments without subcontracting
requirements. This data variation allows me to separately identify all of my model’s primitives.
In the data, the use of DBE firms as subcontractors is prevalent – even when a project does not have a DBE
subcontracting requirement. In particular, 78 percent of all contracts use at least one DBE subcontractor
and 62 percent of contracts without a DBE subcontracting requirement use at least one DBE subcontractor.
DBE subcontractors account for a total of 7.1 percent of all contract dollars awarded by the NMDOT.
3 Theoretical Model
In this section, I develop a theoretical model that formalizes the different channels through which DBE
subcontracting requirements affect a prime contractor’s bidding and DBE subcontracting decisions. My
5This statistic comes from the Iowa Department of Transportation’s January 2011 letting, which is available at
https://www.bidx.com/ia/letting?lettingid=11%2F01%2F19. Other lettings from Iowa have a similar pattern.
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model is closely related to the subcontracting model proposed by Jeziorski and Krasnokutskaya (2016) but
adds a policy that encourages the use of DBE subcontractors.6
For each project, prime contractors decide how much work to give DBE subcontractors and how much
to bid. Prime contractors base their decisions on their non-DBE costs of completing the entire project,
which includes work completed in-house and by non-DBE subcontractors. My model also incorporates
subcontracting requirements when set by the NMDOT.
3.1 Environment and Objective Function
Formally, N risk-neutral bidders compete against each other for the rights to complete a single, indivisible
highway construction project. Bidders are ex-ante symmetric in that each bidder draws their cost of complet-
ing the entire project without DBE subcontractors, ci, independently from the same distribution, F , with
support on the interval [c, c]. This cost, which I refer to as a bidder’s non-DBE cost, includes work done by
the prime contractor and non-DBE subcontractors. Bidders know the realization of their own non-DBE cost
and the distribution of non-DBE costs prior to submitting bids.
Observe that some form of symmetry, which in my model amounts to a common distribution for non-DBE
costs, is a standard simplifying assumption in the auction literature. The alternative would be to have bidders
draw their non-DBE costs from asymmetric distributions, which would require numerical approximations to
solve. Given that my estimation procedure relies on solving each auction in the data many times and that
adding asymmetries would substantially complicate the model’s solution, I maintain the standard symmetry
assumption in this paper.
In addition to the usual setup of a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction, all bidders can choose to
subcontract out portions of their projects to DBE firms. That is to say, bidders choose a share of the project,
si ∈ [0, 1], to subcontract to DBE firms, which reduces their portion of the cost of completing the project
from ci to ci (1− si). I model a bidder’s cost of using DBE subcontractors with an increasing, convex, and
twice continuously differentiable function P : [0, 1] → R+, which I refer to as the DBE pricing function.
This function is known to all bidders and maps the share of the project using DBE subcontractors into a
cost of using DBE subcontractors.7 The cost of using a DBE subcontracting share of si is then P (si), and
6Jeziorski and Krasnokutskaya (2016) also include capacity dynamics and entry in their model. In the data, there is no effect
of DBE subcontracting requirements on both the set of planholders, which is typically used as a measure of the potential number
of bidders, and the fraction of planholders that eventually become bidders. Moreover, different measures of capacity have little
influence on both bidding and DBE subcontractor shares. As a result, the analysis targets bidding and subcontracting strategies
rather than entry and capacity constraints.
7This pricing function represents the prices received by prime contractors from DBE subcontractors through the quote
solicitation process. Ideally, I would model the DBE subcontracting market separately, and the price would be an endogenous
outcome of that market. However, since the data only contains information on the prices listed by DBE subcontractors, I can
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I will refer to this cost as a bidder’s DBE cost. Observe that this function maps shares into amounts and is
different than a standard inverse supply function.
A limitation of placing this type of structure on the DBE subcontracting market is that it assumes away
any type of private information that a bidder may have on using DBE subcontractors. For example, this
assumption precludes the possibility that contractors may form relationships with certain DBE subcontracting
firms to get discounts on prospective construction projects relative to other contractors. Instead, each bidder
has access to the same DBE subcontracting technology.
Some of the NMDOT’s highway construction projects are subject to DBE subcontracting requirements.
Namely, for every prospective highway construction project, the NMDOT specifies a total share of the project,
s ∈ [0, 1], that is to be completed by DBE subcontractors, and this DBE subcontracting requirement is known
to all bidders prior to any bidding or DBE subcontracting decisions. A choice of s = 0 in this environment
is analogous to not having a subcontracting requirement.
I assume that the NMDOT enforces their subcontracting requirements through fines. These fines represent
any additional costs to bidders who miss the subcontracting requirement, including any actual fines and any
additional effort required to show the NMDOT satisfactory effort to use DBE subcontractors. Formally,
subcontracting requirements alters a bidder’s optimal choice of DBE subcontracting and bidding through a
fine function ϕ : [0, 1]→ R+, which is common knowledge and maps a bidder’s choice of DBE subcontracting
given the DBE subcontracting requirement into a non-negative value. For technical reasons, I assume that
ϕ is non-increasing, convex, and continuously differentiable in all of its arguments.
In sum, a bidder’s optimization problem is
max
{bi,si}
(bi − ci (1− si)− P (si)− ϕ (si; s))× Pr (bi < bj∀j ∈ N \ {i}) . (1)
A strategy in this environment is a 2-tuple that consists of a bid function bi : [c, c] → R+ and a DBE
subcontracting share function si : [c, c] → [0, 1], which, for all levels of s, maps non-DBE costs into bidding
and DBE subcontracting choices. In order to reduce the problem’s complexity, I focus on symmetric Nash
equilibria in bidding and DBE subcontracting; therefore, I drop the i subscript from the bidding and DBE
subcontracting strategies without loss of generality.
The DBE subcontracting market introduces a couple of interesting changes into the competitive bidding
environment. Perhaps the most salient of these changes is that the DBE subcontracting market allows all
bidders to substitute between completing projects with non-DBE resources and with DBE subcontractors.
only use prices to infer the cost of using DBE subcontractors.
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This substitution benefits the bidders in that increasing the DBE subcontracting share reduces their non-
DBE portion of the cost of completing the contract; however, this substitution is costly in that it requires
bidders to give up a portion of their profits to their DBE subcontractors. Another notable change is that
DBE subcontracting creates a shared component in bidders’ costs of completing the entire project since all
bidders have equal access to DBE subcontracting.
3.2 DBE Subcontracting Strategies
I begin my analysis of bidding and DBE subcontracting behavior by solving for the optimal DBE subcon-
tracting share given a non-DBE cost realization and a DBE subcontracting requirement. I use the first-order
conditions to characterize an optimal DBE subcontracting share s (ci; s). My analysis of the second-order
conditions is contained in the appendix; see appendix A.1.1. For an interior choice of s (ci; s), the first-order
conditions require that
ci = P
′ (si) + ϕ′ (si; s) . (2)
For bidders whose optimal choice is to use no DBE subcontractors, the following condition must hold:
ci < P
′ (0) + ϕ′ (0; s) . (3)
Likewise, bidders whose optimal choice is to subcontract the entire project to DBE firms must have the
following condition hold:
ci > P
′ (1) + ϕ′ (1; s) . (4)
Because the fine is continuously differentiable, there is no possibility that prime contractors with different
non-DBE costs will bunch at the requirement.8
There are a couple of key properties of optimal DBE subcontracting. Similar to Jeziorski and Krasnokut-
skaya (2016), the optimal DBE subcontracting decision does not depend on the probability of winning the
auction. Intuitively, subcontracting only affects a bidder’s objective function through the payoff conditional
on winning and does not directly affect the probability of winning. Bidders, therefore, do not take the prob-
ability of winning into account when deciding how to use DBE subcontractors. Another characteristic of
optimal DBE subcontracting is that the optimal share does not depend on the bid. In this sense, one can
reinterpret the optimal decisions of a bidder as follows: upon the realization of ci, bidders first determine
how much of the project to subcontract out to DBE firms; then, bidders determine how much to bid given
8In the data, only one firm subcontracts at the requirement.
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their optimal choice of si.
Before moving into the bidding strategies, note the effect of DBE subcontracting requirements on DBE
subcontracting decisions. With an interior choice of s (ci; s), assigning a positive DBE subcontracting re-
quirement on a project only affects the DBE subcontractor choice through the marginal fine rather than
the fine’s value. From a policy perspective, bidders are more likely to change their subcontracting behavior
if ϕ changes rapidly in si, implying that policies that impose larger marginal fines for missing the DBE
subcontracting requirement are more effective in changing equilibrium DBE subcontracting shares.
3.3 Bidding Strategies
In addition to selecting a DBE subcontracting share, bidders must also decide on how to bid. To characterize
that decision, I first separate a bidder’s non-DBE cost of completing the project from its total cost of
completing the project, which I will now refer to as its project cost. A bidder’s project cost consists of its
non-DBE cost, its DBE costs, and any fines.9 Formally, I define a bidder’s project cost as
φ (ci; s) = ci (1− s (ci; s)) + P (s (ci; s)) + ϕ (s (ci; s) ; s) .
Substituting φ into equation (1) and removing the optimization over si reduces the problem to a first-
price sealed-bid procurement auction, where bidders draw a project cost rather than a non-DBE cost. This
transformed optimization problem together with boundary condition b
(
φ
)
= φ has a unique solution that
is increasing in φ, given arguments from Reny and Zamir (2004), Athey (2001) and Lebrun (2006).10 As a
result, I focus on symmetric bidding strategies that are increasing in φ.
There is a tight relationship between a bidder’s project cost and a bidder’s non-DBE cost. In particular,
observe that
φ′ (ci; s) = (1− s (ci; s)) ≥ 0, (5)
where the above inequality uses the first-order conditions on DBE subcontracting to eliminate the extra
terms in the derivative. Equation (5) demonstrates that the project cost is increasing in ci whenever s (ci; s) ∈
[0, 1) and flat whenever s (ci; s) = 1. Intuitively, bidders with lower non-DBE costs should also have lower
project costs unless their non-DBE costs are high enough that it is optimal to subcontract the entire project
to DBE firms. Furthermore, this relationship implies that the bid function is increasing in ci, except when
9Recall that one can calculate optimal subcontracting independently of the bid. Therefore, the project cost can be found
prior to bidding and can be substituted in the objective function, obviating the need to optimize over si.
10Observe that φ = P (1) + ϕ (1; s) is the project cost of a bidder that subcontracts the entire project to DBE firms. I derive
this expression from the previous result that the optimal DBE subcontracting share is increasing in ci.
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s (ci; s) = 1.
Using an envelope theorem argument based on Milgrom and Segal (2002) and equation (5), I derive an
expression for the optimal bid function in terms of non-DBE costs. Proposition 1 presents the bid function
expression, with the details of its derivation contained in Appendix A.2.11
Proposition 1. The optimal bid function is
b (ci; s) =
∫ c
ci
(1− s (c˜; s)) (1− F (c˜))N−1 dc˜
(1− F (ci))N−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
+ ci (1− s (ci; s)) + P (s (ci; s)) + ϕ (s (ci; s) ; s)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
Project Cost
(6)
There are a couple of key features of the bid function. In particular, one can interpret the optimal bid
function as a strategic markup12 over project costs. An increase in DBE subcontracting necessarily reduces
a bidder’s markup and total non-DBE costs. Moreover, the fine function appears as an additive term in the
bid function, meaning that bidders pass fines through to their bids.
3.4 The Role of DBE Subcontracting Requirements
Subcontracting requirements can introduce several interesting changes in equilibrium bidding and DBE sub-
contracting, which come from the features of the equilibrium bid and DBE subcontracting functions. I
summarize those changes in the next proposition and corollaries and provide the proofs of each statement in
Appendix A.
Proposition 2. For a given non-DBE cost draw ci, if s (ci; 0) 6= s (ci; s), then s (ci; 0) < s (ci; s).
Proposition 2 says that when the policy can affect a bidder’s DBE subcontracting, subcontracting re-
quirements will increase the share of work given to DBE subcontractors. The idea behind the proof is that
prime contractors want to increase the share of work given to DBE subcontractors to avoid incurring any
fines. Therefore, prime contractors will increase the share of work given to DBE subcontractors when DBE
11The NMDOT does not use reservation prices in its procurement auctions, so my model does not include a reservation price.
The absence of reservation prices can potentially be problematic, though: when there is only one bidder in an auction, the
lack of competition could give rise to unusually high equilibrium bids. To address this problem, I follow Li and Zheng (2009)
in assuming that auctions with one bidder face additional competition from the NMDOT in the form of an additional bidder
during the structural estimation and counterfactual policy simulations. This assumption approximates the right of the NMDOT
to reject high winning bids. In the data, only 4.6 percent of all auctions have one bidder.
12Technically, the markup term contains the bidder’s markup and the markups of all non-DBE subcontractors. I will continue
to refer to this term as the markup where this distinction does not cause confusion.
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subcontractors are sufficiently low priced. The next corollary addresses how subcontracting requirements
affect project costs.
Corollary 1. DBE subcontracting requirements weakly raise project costs.
The intuition behind corollary 1 is that, in the absence of DBE subcontracting requirements, bidders
will choose their share of DBE subcontractors to extract the highest possible profits, which in this case is
analogous to minimizing their project costs. As shown in proposition 2, subcontracting requirements can
change DBE subcontracting decisions, and that change leads to higher project costs. The next corollary ties
DBE subcontracting requirements to a bidder’s markup.
Corollary 2. DBE subcontracting requirements weakly lower markups.
The proof of corollary 2 relies on propositions 1 and 2. In particular, the expression for the optimal bid
function in proposition 1 implies that an increase in DBE subcontracting reduces the bidder’s markup, while
proposition 2 shows that DBE subcontracting requirements (weakly) increase total DBE subcontracting.
From those two propositions, it immediately follows that DBE subcontracting requirements weakly lower
markups. Intuitively, subcontracting requirements distort a bidder’s DBE subcontracting decisions towards
completing a project with more DBE subcontractors and less non-DBE resources. Since bidders can only
markup components of their costs that are private and the cost of DBE subcontractors is common, that
distortion leads to a reduction in markups.
4 Numerical Example
In this section, I turn to a numerical example to illustrate the main points of the theory. For this example,
I assume that two prime contractors (N = 2) are competing for a single construction project. I assume that
the prime contractors’ non-DBE costs are distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1]. For simplicity, I assume
that the pricing functions and the fine function are quadratic and that prime contractors are only fined if
their total share of work going to DBE subcontractors is below the subcontracting requirement:
P (si) =
ξs2i
2
ϕ (si; s) =

λ(si−s)2
2 if si < s
0 if si ≥ s
,
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where ξ and λ are coefficients that control the steepness of the pricing and fine functions respectively. To
keep this example simple, I set ξ = 2; I set the fine coefficient, λ, to 3 so that the fine is sufficiently steep to
visibly change subcontracting behavior. I use a subcontracting requirement of 30 percent (s = 0.3) when it
applies.
I begin my analysis by first solving for the optimal DBE subcontracting share as a function of non-DBE
costs. To highlight the effects of subcontracting requirements, I perform this calculation twice: once when
there is a requirement and once where there is no requirement. Figure 1 contains plots of these functions.
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Figure 1: DBE Share Function
Subcontracting requirements lead to a couple of interesting changes to DBE subcontracting behavior.
In particular, subcontracting requirements increase the share of work allocated to DBE subcontractors for
prime contractors with lower non-DBE costs and leaves shares unchanged for prime contractors with higher
non-DBE costs, which is consistent with proposition 2. Intuitively, prime contractors with lower non-DBE
costs find it more profitable to use non-DBE resources instead of the relatively more expensive DBE subcon-
tractors. The fine gives these contractors an extra incentive to increase their DBE shares, which is why DBE
subcontracting is higher for them when there is a requirement. Prime contractors with higher non-DBE costs
are more inclined to use DBE subcontractors to lower their project costs and may even subcontract above
and beyond the requirement. When prime contractors do subcontract above the requirement, the fine is no
longer effective, so there is no change in DBE subcontracting behavior.
Given the solutions for optimal DBE subcontracting, I next analyze equilibrium bidding with and without
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Figure 2: Bid Function
the subcontracting requirement. Specifically, I use equation (6) to obtain a solution for the equilibrium bids
given the uniform assumption on non-DBE costs and the functional forms for the DBE pricing function and
the fine function. I plot these functions in figure 2. A striking feature of the bid functions is that bids are
virtually unchanged with subcontracting requirements relative to without subcontracting requirements, even
when prime contractors have low non-DBE costs. For this range of non-DBE costs, the reduction in markups
is sufficiently high to mitigate the cost of using more DBE subcontractors. Also note that firms that would
subcontract beyond the requirement do not change their bidding behavior, which is why the bid functions
overlap.
Taken together, the simulations demonstrate that subcontracting requirements can increase the share
of work allocated to DBE subcontractors without substantially changing final cost of procurement. The
requirement mainly affects prime contractors with low non-DBE costs, causing them to increase their usage
of DBE subcontractors. With sufficiently high markups, increased DBE subcontracting only slightly changes
optimal bidding, implying small changes in procurement costs.
5 Empirical Model and Estimation
Although the theoretical model can account for a number of different ways in which subcontracting require-
ments can affect bidding and DBE subcontracting, it cannot be applied to the New Mexico data without
additional assumptions on the model’s primitives. In this section, I outline those assumptions and provide a
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description of the estimation procedure. I end this section by discussing the sources of variation in the data
that identify the empirical model’s parameters.
5.1 Parametric Assumptions
To account for a rich set of observed project characteristics while avoiding the curse of dimensionality, I
estimate a parametric version of the simplified model. I assume that a project, indexed by w, is uniquely
determined by the vector (xw, zw, sw, uw, Nw), where sw is the DBE subcontracting requirement, xw and zw
are potentially overlapping vectors of the remaining project-level observables that affect non-DBE costs and
DBE pricing respectively, uw is a project characteristic unobservable by the econometrician but observable
to the bidders that affects DBE pricing, and Nw is the number of bidders on a project.
I use the project characteristic uw to represent unobserved conditions in the DBE subcontracting market,
such as the availability of DBE firms to act as subcontractors and the concentration of DBE subcontractors in
a particular area. Given that the NMDOT may have extra information on these unobservable characteristics
when establishing a DBE subcontracting requirement, I allow uw to depend on sw. Specifically, I assume
the distribution of uw follows a gamma distribution with a shape parameter of 1 and a scale parameter of
σu = exp (σu0 + σu1DBE req), where DBE req = sw × 100. This assumption allows for the possibility that
the NMDOT assigns subcontracting requirements on projects where DBEs are less costly.
A potential issue with this specification is that the unobserved characteristic may be correlated with
non-DBE costs, as would be the case if unobserved conditions in the DBE subcontracting market also affect
the general subcontracting market. I find no evidence for this type of correlation in the data. Regressions
of non-DBE subcontracting on DBE subcontracting and other project-level observables produces small and
statistically insignificant coefficients for DBE subcontracting. I also find that non-DBE subcontracting is
uncorrelated with the requirement, which is likely because the agency that sets these requirements in New
Mexico does not consider subcontracting conditions beyond those that pertain to DBE subcontractors. Taken
together, the evidence suggests that unobserved factors in the DBE subcontracting market can possibly be
estimated separately from non-DBE costs. To the extent that there are correlations between non-DBE costs
and the unobserved characteristic, my estimates are limited.
I also parameterize the non-DBE cost distribution so that it is consistent with the theory. In particular,
I assume that non-DBE costs follow a truncated log-normal distribution:
ci ∼ T LN
(
ψ′xw, σ2c , cw | xw
)
,
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where ψ is a vector of structural parameters that shift the non-DBE cost distribution and cw is the
project-specific upper bound on the non-DBE cost distribution. Given that ci is log-normal, its support
is bounded below by 0. I use the variable cw to get the upper limit of integration when solving for the
equilibrium bids in equation (6), and I construct cw by using the highest bid normalized by the engineer’s
estimate in the sample. Specifically, let xˆw ∈ xw be a project’s engineer’s estimate, and suppose k is the
maximum of the ratio of bids relative to the engineer’s estimate
(
k = max
{
biw
xˆw
})
; then, cw = kxˆw.
13 In
practice, k = 3.94.
I use parametric functional forms for the pricing and fine functions similar to the ones used by Jeziorski
and Krasnokutskaya (2016). In particular, I assume that the DBE pricing function and fine function take
the following functional forms:
P (si) =
(
α0 + α1si + α2
si
1− si + α
′
3zw + uw
)
sixˆw (7)
ϕ (si; sw) =

γ (si − s)2 xˆ if si < s
0, if si ≥ s
. (8)
The hyperbolic term in equation (7) prevents firms from subcontracting entire projects to DBE subcon-
tractors. In the data, no firms select a DBE share of 100%, so I use this functional form to mirror that
empirical fact. The scaling by xˆ in P and ϕ ensures that the problem scales properly since projects vary
in size; the scaling by si in P ensures that a prime contractor that allocates none of the project to DBE
subcontractors does not have a DBE cost. I use a piecewise functional form in equation (8) so that only
prime contractors who fail to meet the DBE subcontracting requirement will ever be fined. It is important to
note, however, that the parameter values must be constrained for the problem to have desirable properties,
such as an interior maximum, an increasing price function, and a non-increasing fine function for different
parameter guesses. I present these constraints in Appendix B.1.
5.2 Estimation
Given a set of structural parameters, my empirical model generates unique solutions for DBE subcontracting
shares and equilibrium bids. The final set of structural parameters are the ones whose predictions are closest
13Observe that this upper limit is only valid if the observation in which this ratio is maximized has no share of the project
allocated to DBE subcontractors since the boundary condition on bids is in terms of project costs rather than non-DBE costs.
While I do not observe the share of the project allocated to DBE subcontractors for losing bidders, the winning bidder in the
auction I use to set k has a DBE share of 0, which makes this approximation plausible.
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to the outcomes observed in the data. I obtain these parameters with an indirect inference estimator, which
matches the parameters from an auxiliary model estimated with the true data and simulated data.14
I simulate the data in several steps. Given a guess for the structural parameters θ = (ψ, σc, σu, α0, α1, α2,
α3, γ), I first simulate Nw non-DBE costs for each auction. Since bids are increasing in non-DBE costs, I
take the lowest of the Nw non-DBE costs as the non-DBE cost of the winning bidder. Let W denote the
total number of auctions observed in the data and H the total number of simulations. In total, I select
WH non-DBE costs from the
∑
wNwH simulated non-DBE costs. Next, I calculate the equilibrium DBE
subcontracting shares using the first-order conditions on DBE subcontracting in equation (2). To account
for the corner solutions, I take the maximum of 0 and the DBE shares obtained from solving the first-order
conditions for si; the other corner solution is ruled out because the parameterization of P (si) would imply
infinite DBE costs when si = 1. With the shares calculated, I solve for the equilibrium winning bids using
equation (6). This step requires an approximation of the optimal DBE share function, so I use polynomial
approximations obtained by fitting a polynomial on a grid of optimal DBE shares for each auction.
To then implement the indirect inference estimator, I need to select an auxiliary model. In general, the
auxiliary model should be straightforward to estimate and account for the endogenous outcomes. The two
endogenous outcomes are the equilibrium bids and DBE subcontracting shares, so I use a linear ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression of the log-winning bid and a linear OLS regression of the winning bidder’s
DBE subcontracting share as the two components of my auxiliary model. Specifically, if sw is the share of
the project the winning bidder allocates to DBE subcontractors in auction w and bw is the winning bidder’s
bid in auction w, then my auxiliary model for the DBE share and winning bid is
sw =
 xw
sw

′
βs + sw
log(bw) =
 xw
sw

′
βb + bw,
where βs are the parameters of the DBE share regression, βb are the parameters of the winning bid
regression, sw is the error term on the DBE share regression, bw is the error term on the winning bid
regression, and sw is the subcontracting requirement in auction w.
I use a Wald criterion function to match the true data to the simulated data. The indirect inference
14Indirect inference was first used by Smith (1993) in a time-series setting and extended by Gourieroux et al. (1993) to a more
general form. I use methods from this extended version in estimating the empirical model.
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structural parameter estimates, θˆ, are then the solution the following optimization problem:
min
θ∈Θ
[
βˆW − β˜HW (θ)
]′
ΩˆW
[
βˆW − β˜HW (θ)
]
,
where βˆW are the auxiliary model parameters estimated from the data, β˜HW (θ) are the auxiliary model
parameters estimated from the structural parameters, and ΩˆW is some positive definite weighting matrix. In
practice, I use the indirect inference estimator’s optimal weight matrix as the weighting matrix, and I use the
estimator’s asymptotic distribution to calculate standard errors. For a detailed explanation of the optimal
weight matrix and standard errors, see Appendix B.2.
5.3 Parametric Identification
I conclude this section by discussing the variation in the data that identifies the model’s structural parameters.
These parameters are the mean and standard deviation of the non-DBE cost distribution (ψ and σc), the
parameters of the observed components of the DBE pricing function (α0, α1, α2 and α3), the parameters of
the unobserved component of the DBE pricing function (σu0 and σu1), and the fine function parameter (γ).
In the data, I observe projects without subcontracting requirements where prime contractors use no DBE
subcontractors. The bids on these projects allow me to identify the non-DBE cost distribution parame-
ters since the bid function does not depend on the DBE pricing or fine functions when there are no DBE
subcontractors and no subcontracting requirements.
From there, I can identify the parameters of the observed and unobserved parts of the DBE pricing function
from two types of projects: projects with no subcontracting requirements and projects with subcontracting
requirements where prime contractors exceed the subcontracting requirement. Given the non-DBE cost
distribution parameters, the variation in bids and DBE shares on these projects correspond to changes in
the DBE pricing function. I observe additional variation in bidding and DBE subcontracting between these
two types of projects, and this variation allows me to identify the σu1 parameter – which accounts for the
possibility that the NMDOT assigns subcontracting requirements when they are less costly. Put differently,
if firms tend to use more DBE subcontractors when there is no requirement, then the model would suggest
that the NMDOT uses subcontracting requirements when DBE subcontractors are more costly.
The last parameter that needs to be identified is the fine parameter, γ. Given the non-DBE cost distribu-
tion parameters and DBE pricing function parameters, I identify γ from the bids and DBE shares of prime
contractors who miss the DBE subcontracting requirement. The idea here is that fines only affect bids and
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subcontracting when a prime contractor fails to reach a given requirement, so the model attributes differences
in bidding and subcontracting between prime contractors who meet and do not meet the requirement to γ.
6 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I perform the empirical analysis on the procurement data from New Mexico. My analysis
begins with a description of the data and variables. I then present summary statistics and descriptive
regressions to highlight the bidding and DBE subcontracting patterns present in the data. Finally, I provide
the structural parameter estimates and a discussion of the model’s fit.
6.1 Data Description and Variables
The data contains federally funded highway construction contracts issued by the NMDOT from 2008 until
2014 for the maintenance and construction of transportation systems. In order to be consistent with the
model, I do not include contracts won by DBE prime contractors.15 I construct the subcontracting portion
of the data from administrative records from New Mexico’s SHARE system. The SHARE data is part of
New Mexico’s state-wide accounting system and tracks all of the transactions between the NMDOT and the
contractors who are ultimately awarded projects using federal aid. This data contains information on the
subcontractors used in each construction project, including each subcontractor’s DBE status and individual
award amount.
I augment the SHARE data with data on contract characteristics. In particular, I include the competition
each winning contractor faces in terms of the actual number of bidders and the number of bidders who request
information about each project, the advertised DBE subcontracting requirement, the type of work necessary
to complete each project, an engineer’s estimated cost of completing each project, and the expected number
of days needed to complete each project in the set of observable project characteristics. I gather this data
from publicly available NMDOT bidding records, which includes the IFB documents the NMDOT uses to
advertise their projects and spreadsheets containing each project’s received bids and eligible bidders.
I define the complete set of variables observed in the full data set as follows. DBE share is the percentage
share of the total project awarded to DBE subcontractors. Engineer’s estimate an engineer’s estimated
cost of a project, which is provided by engineers from the NMDOT. Winning bid is the bid that ultimately
wins the procurement auction. Subprojects are smaller portions of a larger project, which are specified in
15My model assumes that the prime contractor is not a DBE firm, which is the case for the majority of contracts awarded by
the NMDOT. Moreover, prime DBE contractors are not affected by DBE subcontracting requirements since the prime contractor
must perform most of the work.
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the IFB documents and are used as a measure of how easily a contract can use subcontractors.16 Working
days are the number of days a given project is expected to take to complete, and licenses refers to the
number of separate license classifications required to complete the project. Length indicates the length of the
construction project, and DBE req is the level of the DBE subcontracting requirement. Planholders refers
to the number of firms requesting the documents necessary to submit a bid, and federal highway and urban
are indicator variables that take on a value of one if a project is located on a federal highway or an urban
county respectively.
I use additional observables to distinguish a project’s location and the type of work requested for each
project. District is a variable that indicates a project’s administrative district. In New Mexico, there are a
total of six mutually exclusive districts – each serving a different region of the state. I separate the type of
work requested for each project into six different categories: road work, bridge work, lighting, safety work,
stockpiling, and other. I use the other category as the reference class.
6.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics from the entire sample of NMDOT highway construction contracts.
I divide projects into four categories: projects with subcontracting requirements, projects without subcon-
tracting requirements, projects eligible for subcontracting requirements yet do not have any, and the entire
sample of projects. Recall that New Mexico considers all projects estimated to cost more than $300, 000
eligible for subcontracting requirements.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
With Req. W/o Req. W/o Req. & Eligible Total
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Eng. Estimate (1000s) 5530.86 6682.41 3817.25 6781.04 4120.84 6975.37 4618.99 6780.67
Winning Bid (1000s) 5256.19 6843.40 3438.49 5858.68 3712.46 6019.81 4288.93 6394.94
Bidders 4.64 1.94 4.08 1.93 4.14 1.96 4.34 1.95
Subprojects 9.83 5.12 7.21 4.70 7.47 4.78 8.43 5.07
DBE Share (%) 9.15 7.20 4.25 6.29 4.30 5.77 6.54 7.15
DBE Req. (%) 4.20 1.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.97 2.47
Share-Req. Gap (%) 4.95 6.91 4.25 6.29 4.30 5.77 4.58 6.59
Comply if Req. 0.91 0.29 0.91 0.29
Number of Contracts 182 207 191 389
Table 1 indicates a couple of differences across projects with and without subcontracting requirements.
Projects with subcontracting requirements have, on average, 2.4 more subprojects and are estimated to cost
16See Appendix E for an example of subprojects.
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$1.4 million more than eligible projects without subcontracting requirements. Also, projects with subcon-
tracting requirements allocate 4.9 percentage points more to DBE subcontractors relative to eligible projects
without subcontracting requirements. Despite these differences, projects with subcontracting requirements
tend to attract a similar number of bidders as eligible projects without subcontracting requirements, and
on projects with requirements, many of the prime contractors comply with the requirement – allocating an
average of 5.0 percentage points more than the required amount to DBE subcontractors.
6.3 Descriptive Regressions
In order to explore bidding patterns in the data, I run OLS regressions of the log-winning bids on the covariates
collected from the NMDOT bidding data. Table 2 reports regression coefficients. The main parameter of
interest is the coefficient on the DBE requirement variable since it shows the correlation between the winning
bids and the DBE subcontracting requirement. Column (1) only controls for the variable of interest and the
engineer’s estimate. Column (2) includes additional controls for complexity (length, subprojects, working days
and licensing requirements) and the type of work requested. I capture the competitive bidding environment
in the second column by the number of planholders and the number of bidders, while I include other control
variables such as administrative district (not displayed in the regression tables), whether a project is in an
urban or rural county, and whether the project takes place on a federal highway to account for a project’s
proposed location. Column (3) adds month and year fixed effects as a control for seasonality. I repeat these
regression specifications in columns (4) - (6) for a sample limited to projects eligible for DBE subcontracting
requirements.
The regressions indicate that the winning bids are uncorrelated with DBE subcontracting requirements:
across all specifications, the coefficient on the DBE requirement variable is small and statistically insignif-
icant.17 These results suggest that DBE subcontracting requirements are not associated with the ultimate
cost of procurement and are comparable to De Silva et al. (2012) who find a lack of an effect of DBE
subcontracting requirements on asphalt procurement auctions in Texas.
Given that winning bids and DBE subcontracting requirements are uncorrelated, it is reasonable to
question whether DBE subcontracting requirements have any impact on DBE subcontracting. To address
this question, I conduct a regression analysis of the percentage of projects allocated to DBE subcontractors
17Observe that these coefficients will be biased if there are unobservable factors that affect both bidding (later, DBE subcon-
tracting decisions) and the decision of whether to include DBE subcontracting requirements on a particular project. While the
control variables account for some of the factors used in setting DBE subcontracting requirements, the possibility of biased re-
gression estimates still remains. My empirical model explicitly accounts for this type of bias because it allows the subcontracting
requirements to affect the price of using DBE subcontractors through unobservable factors.
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Table 2: OLS Regression of the Winning Bids
Dependent variable:
log(Winning Bid)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.982∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.021) (0.021)
DBE Req (%) −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
log(Length + 1) 0.021 0.026∗ 0.019 0.023∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
log(Planholders) −0.050 0.014 −0.064 −0.031
(0.044) (0.054) (0.043) (0.047)
log(Subprojects) 0.079∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024)
Number of Licenses Required 0.038∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
log(Working Days) 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.009
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
Bidders −0.024∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Federal Highway 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.004
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Urban −0.054∗ −0.056∗ −0.052∗ −0.048
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Work Type/District Controls X X X X
Month/Year FEs X X
Observations 389 389 389 373 373 373
Adjusted R2 0.976 0.980 0.982 0.973 0.979 0.981
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Descriptive OLS regressions of the winning bid on project-level observables. Columns
(1)-(3) use all projects, while columns (4)-(6) only use projects eligible for subcon-
tracting requirements. Standard errors are robust.
by winning contractors by using the same six regression specifications as the winning bid regressions. I report
the results in table 3.
Unlike the winning bid regressions, DBE subcontracting requirements have a positive and significant
correlation with DBE participation. Increasing the DBE subcontracting requirement by one percent increases
the share of DBE firms used as subcontractors by about one percent over the different regression specifications.
These results suggest that the DBE subcontracting requirements, although uncorrelated with the winning
bids, are associated with their goal of increasing the utilization of DBE firms.18
18A property of DBE subcontracting from the model, which is shown in Appendix A, is that the total share of work given
to DBE subcontractors is non-decreasing in ci. This property can potentially be rejected by the data if bidders who submit
higher bids choose lower DBE subcontracting shares since bids are also increasing in ci for s (ci; s) ∈ [0, 1). Although the data
cannot directly address this issue, I can test this property by using bids as a proxy for non-DBE costs in DBE subcontracting
regressions. When included in a DBE subcontracting regression, the coefficient on the submitted bids is positive, suggesting
that DBE subcontracting shares are associated with higher non-DBE costs.
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Table 3: OLS Regressions of the DBE Shares
Dependent variable:
DBE Share (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.240 −0.304 −0.353 0.308 −0.204 −0.139
(0.351) (0.581) (0.622) (0.306) (0.559) (0.530)
DBE Req (%) 1.108∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.152) (0.183) (0.142) (0.156) (0.182)
log(Length + 1) −0.116 0.017 −0.298 −0.205
(0.506) (0.511) (0.460) (0.459)
log(Planholders) −0.567 1.650 −1.190 1.540
(1.795) (1.940) (1.626) (1.952)
log(Subprojects) 1.946∗∗ 1.412 2.209∗∗ 1.847∗∗
(0.840) (0.870) (0.865) (0.869)
Number of Licenses Required 1.509∗ 1.758∗ 1.060 1.052
(0.905) (0.929) (0.826) (0.785)
log(Working Days) −0.407 −0.606 −0.280 −0.533
(0.608) (0.603) (0.610) (0.608)
Bidders −0.076 −0.060 0.003 −0.011
(0.213) (0.215) (0.197) (0.215)
Federal Highway −0.133 −0.237 0.038 0.009
(0.701) (0.686) (0.698) (0.688)
Urban 2.055∗∗ 1.903∗∗ 1.847∗∗ 1.549∗
(0.934) (0.970) (0.841) (0.871)
Work Type/District Controls X X X X
Month/Year FEs X X
Observations 389 389 389 373 373 373
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.216 0.229 0.162 0.217 0.235
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Descriptive OLS regressions of the DBE subcontractor share on project-level ob-
servables. Columns (1)-(3) use all projects, while columns (4)-(6) only use projects
eligible for subcontracting requirements. Standard errors are robust.
Evidence that Higher DBE Shares Reduce Markups
My final piece of descriptive evidence addresses how the share of work allocated to DBE subcontractors
relates to firm markups. In the model, increasing the number of competing bidders affects bids by reducing
markups. The share of work given to DBE subcontractors also reduces markups, so the reduction in bids
due to an increase in the number of competing bidders should be attenuated by the amount of work assigned
to DBE subcontractors. In the reduced form, this attenuation effect will appear in the coefficient of an
interaction term between the number of bidders and the share of work allocated to DBE subcontractors; a
positive coefficient indicates that the share of work given to DBE subcontractors reduces the loss in markups
due to an increased number of competitors.
To investigate whether there is evidence of this attenuation effect in the data, I perform regressions of
the log-winning bid on the project-level covariates, with an additional control for the DBE share and an
interaction term between the DBE share and the number of bidders. The regression specifications follow
the same format as the winning bid regressions, and the coefficient of interest here is the coefficient on the
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Table 4: OLS Regressions of the Share-Bidder Interaction
Dependent variable:
log(Winning Bid)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.986∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
DBE Share (%) −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Bidders −0.038∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
DBE Share × Bidders 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005)
Project/Work Type/District Controls X X X X
Month/Year FEs X X
Observations 389 389 389 373 373 373
Adjusted R2 0.979 0.980 0.982 0.977 0.979 0.981
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Descriptive OLS regressions of the winning bid on project-level observables with
bidder-share interaction terms. Columns (1)-(3) use all projects, while columns (4)-
(6) only use projects eligible for subcontracting requirements. Standard errors are
robust.
interaction term.
I present the results for the entire sample of winning bids and the winning bids on projects eligible for
DBE subcontracting requirements in table 4. Consistent with the model, there is a positive and statistically
significant coefficient on the interaction term across all regression specifications. Taken together with the
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the number of bidders, these regressions suggest that DBE
utilization may work to reduce markups.
Although I do not account for entry in these regressions or the rest of my analysis, observe that my
results can be interpreted within a particular class of entry models commonly used in the literature. Namely,
my results correspond to the bidding stage in models where bidders base their entry decisions on a bid
preparation cost that is independent of their project cost and observe the number of bidders prior to bidding
(see Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), for example). Because there can be no selection on project costs in the
entry phase of those models, the bidding stage in that model is the same as mine conditional on the number
of entrants.
To summarize the main results, the descriptive regressions provide evidence for how DBE subcontracting
requirements affect bidding, how DBE subcontracting requirements affect the amount of work subcontracted
to DBE firms, and how the share of work given to DBE subcontractors affects firm markups. I find that win-
ning bids are uncorrelated with DBE subcontracting requirements and that DBE subcontracting requirements
are associated with higher DBE shares. These two results appear to be contradictory given the expected
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increase in procurement costs associated with using disadvantaged subcontractors, motivating the need to
investigate the channels proposed in the theoretical model. Finally, I find evidence that the share of work
given to DBE subcontractors reduces firm markups, which is consistent with the implications of the model.
6.4 Structural Parameter Estimates
Next, I turn to the parameter estimates from the empirical model. I assume that the distribution of log-non-
DBE costs is linear in a project’s engineer’s estimate, complexity, location, and type of work required with a
constant variance. The parameters of the DBE pricing function follow the functional form outlined in equation
(7), with the distribution of the unobserved price shock allowed to depend on the DBE subcontracting
requirement and a control for the number of subprojects. The parameters of the fine function follow equation
(8). Since the subcontracting requirement can affect the realization of the unobserved pricing component, I
only use projects eligible for DBE subcontracting requirements in the data.
Table 5: Parameter Estimates for the Log-Normal Cost Distribution
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 0.776 0.278
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.922 0.012
log(Length + 1) 0.041 0.011
log(Planholders) 0.043 0.099
log(Subprojects) 0.080 0.021
Licenses 0.038 0.015
log(Working Days) 0.009 0.012
Federal Highway -0.017 0.014
Urban -0.015 0.020
District 2 -0.069 0.020
District 3 -0.060 0.021
District 4 -0.002 0.028
District 5 -0.044 0.023
District 6 -0.065 0.021
Bridge work -0.007 0.025
Lighting -0.065 0.058
Road Work 0.043 0.028
Safety Work -0.013 0.028
Stockpiling 0.162 0.063
σc 0.261 0.112
Note: Parameter estimates for the mean and standard
deviation of log-costs.
I present the results for the non-DBE cost distribution parameter estimates in table 5. A firm’s non-DBE
cost is affected by a number of observable factors. In particular, I find that non-DBE costs are heavily
influenced by the engineer’s estimate; a one percent increase in the engineer’s estimate corresponds to a 0.92
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percent non-DBE cost increase, and this coefficient is statistically significant. Although much of a firm’s
non-DBE cost is driven by the engineer’s estimate, other observable project characteristics can influence the
mean of the log-non-DBE cost distribution. For example, a project’s district ranges from decreasing non-
DBE costs by 6.9 percent to 0.2 percent relative to a project that is located in district 1. The effect of the
type of work requested on non-DBE costs ranges from decreasing non-DBE costs by 6.5 percent to increasing
non-DBE costs by 19.6 percent relative to projects classified as other.
Table 6: Parameter Estimates for the DBE Pricing and Fine Functions
Coefficient Standard Error
σu
Constant 0.333 0.331
DBE Req (%) -0.186 0.059
Pricing Constant (α0) 0.171 0.120
si (α1) 0.518 0.316
si
1−si (α2) 0.637 0.300
1/Subprojects (α3) 0.122 0.044
Fine Parameter (γ) 7.371 30.477
Note: Parameter estimates for the DBE pricing and
fine functions. The standard deviation of DBE pric-
ing shocks is modeled as σu = exp (σu0 + σu1DBE req),
where DBE req is the level of the DBE subcontracting
requirement.
The second set of parameter estimates include the parameters of the DBE pricing function and the fine
function. I summarize these estimates in table 6. Higher DBE subcontracting requirements are associated
with lower DBE pricing shocks, implying that the NMDOT sets these requirements when DBEs are more
readily available. The DBE pricing function parameters imply that – when the level of uw, the number of
subprojects, and the level of the DBE subcontracting requirement are all fixed at their respective means
on DBE-eligible projects – choosing a DBE subcontracting share of 1 percent requires a payment of 1.15
percent of the project’s engineer’s estimate to DBE subcontractors. The parameter of the fine function,
although noisy due to the small number of firms who do not comply with DBE requirements, implies that
the fine associated with missing the DBE subcontracting requirement by five percent is about 1.8 percent of
the project’s engineer’s estimate. For the average engineer’s estimate on projects with DBE subcontracting
requirements, this fine amounts to about $101, 900.
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6.5 Model Fit
I evaluate the model’s fit by comparing the predicted DBE shares and winning bids to the DBE shares and
winning bids observed in the data on projects eligible for DBE subcontracting requirements. Table 7 contains
the moments of these outcomes tabulated by whether there is a requirement; the shares are in percentages,
and the winning bids are in millions.
Table 7: Model Fit
Actual Predicted
With Req.
Avg. DBE Share (%) 9.15 9.05
Sd. DBE Share (%) 7.20 7.98
Avg. Winning Bid (in Millions) 5.26 5.12
Sd. Winning Bid (in Millions) 6.84 6.33
Without Req.
Avg. DBE Share (%) 4.30 4.18
Sd. DBE Share (%) 5.77 7.15
Avg. Winning Bid (in Millions) 3.71 3.76
Sd. Winning Bid (in Millions) 6.02 6.10
Note: The averages and standard deviations of the
predicted and actual procurement outcomes.
The model’s predicted moments match these data moments reasonably well. The model’s average DBE
subcontractor shares are within 0.12 percentage points of the true average DBE subcontractor shares, and
the model’s average winning bids are within $140, 000 of the average winning bids in the data. The only
exception is the predicted standard deviation for the DBE shares absent a requirement, which are more
disperse than the actual DBE shares.
7 Counterfactual Analysis
I now use the model’s parameter estimates to predict counterfactual bidding and DBE subcontracting deci-
sions under a variety of different policy alternatives. I first investigate changes in New Mexico’s past sub-
contracting requirements; this exercise allows me to evaluate how subcontracting requirements affected past
procurement outcomes. I then explore other policies aimed at encouraging the use of DBE subcontractors.
In particular, I consider various quota and subsidy policies and compare their outcomes with the outcomes
obtained with subcontracting requirements. In order to be consistent with the projects that New Mexico
sees fit for government intervention, I only use projects with positive DBE subcontracting requirements in
my analysis.
28
A limitation of my counterfactual study is that it does not account for entry. Given that prime contractors
are less likely to bid on contracts with more stringent DBE subcontracting policies and that a smaller number
of bidders leads to higher markups, entry has the potential to bias my findings. In the data, I find that
DBE requirements are uncorrelated with the number of planholders and the proportion of planholders that
eventually become bidders, which suggests that entry may not be a first-order concern in New Mexico for
the modest counterfactual policies I consider here. Nevertheless, any counterfactual estimates related to a
prime contractor’s markup should be viewed as a lower (upper) bound for their actual markups when the
subcontracting policy is more (less) stringent.
7.1 Counterfactual Subcontracting Requirements
The level of the DBE subcontracting requirements can vary from state to state and will impact how prime
contractors use DBE subcontractors. To investigate how different levels of DBE subcontracting requirements
would have affected New Mexico’s procurement auctions, I simulate a range of different auction outcomes
under a variety of different subcontracting requirements, including an elimination of all subcontracting re-
quirements. My analysis in this section focuses on percent changes to the existing DBE subcontracting
requirements. This type of policy adjustment is akin to a uniform change in all DBE subcontracting re-
quirements, with more change given to projects with higher past subcontracting requirements. The reported
policy experiments include outcomes from the model simulated under a 50 percent increase in the DBE
subcontracting requirement, no change in the DBE subcontracting requirement, a 50 percent decrease in the
DBE subcontracting requirement, and an elimination of all subcontracting requirements.
I report the averages of six auction outcomes for each policy experiment. DBE Share is the simulated
share of work going to DBE subcontractors, while Winning Bid refers to the simulated winning bid. Project
Cost corresponds to the simulated project costs, and Markup Reduction is the dollar value of the reduction in
markups associated with using DBE subcontractors. Theoretically, the markup reduction outcome coincides
with the expression
∫ c
ci
s(ci)(1−F (c˜))N−1dc˜
(1−F (ci))N−1 . DBE Cost is the portion of the winning bid that is paid to DBE
subcontractors, and Non-DBE Profits is the markup term, which contains the prime contractor’s and non-
DBE subcontractor’s profits.
I display the results of the policy experiments in table 8. As a general trend, increasing the subcontracting
requirements decreases non-DBE profits, while the remaining outcomes increase. To provide some intuition,
the increase in the requirements gives prime contractors an incentive to use more DBE subcontractors, and
more DBE subcontractors result in higher payments to DBE firms. The increased payments lead to higher
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Table 8: Counterfactual Goal Levels
Increase (50%) Baseline Decrease (50%) Elimination
DBE share (%) 9.68 9.05 8.60 8.42
Winning Bid (in 1000s) 5132.23 5116.78 5106.33 5103.56
Project Cost (in 1000s) 4328.02 4307.12 4292.97 4287.33
Markup Reduction (in 1000s) 108.85 103.39 99.69 96.82
DBE Cost (in 1000s) 354.41 314.10 288.79 278.71
Non-DBE Profits (in 1000s) 804.20 809.66 813.36 816.23
Note: Average auction outcomes for different requirement levels on auctions with DBE subcontracting
reqirements. Effective costs are the costs to complete the entire project, which accounts for DBE
subcontracting. Markup reduction is the dollar value of markups non-DBE firms lose as a result of DBE
subcontracting. DBE cost is the average simulated DBE cost, and non-DBE profits are the profits of
the winning prime contractor and its non-DBE subcontractors.
project costs, lower non-DBE profits, and higher winning bids. These effects are modest, though, since
the fine function only affects the decisions of prime contractors that would otherwise subcontract below the
DBE subcontracting requirement. Conversely, DBE subcontracting has a more pronounced effect on non-
DBE profits. At New Mexico’s past requirement levels, DBE subcontracting reduced average markups by
$103, 390 or 11.3 percent.
To evaluate New Mexico’s subcontracting requirement policy, I compare the baseline model’s predictions
to the predictions of the model when there are no DBE subcontracting requirements. These simulations
predict that New Mexico’s past requirements resulted in a 0.6 percentage point (or 7.5 percent) increase in
the average share of work allocated to DBE subcontractors and a $35, 390 (or 12.7 percent) increase in the
average money awarded to DBE subcontractors. These increases correspond to a $13, 220 (or 0.3 percent)
increase in the average procurement cost and a $6, 570 (or 0.8 percent) decrease in average non-DBE firm
profits.
7.2 Counterfactual Quotas
So far, my analysis shows that using fines to enforce DBE subcontracting requirements can lead to higher DBE
subcontracting shares. The fine, however, does not guarantee that prime contractors fulfill the subcontracting
requirements since prime contractors can miss the requirement and pay the corresponding fee. In contrast,
quotas ensure that prime contractors meet the requirement and can, therefore, lead to different auction
outcomes relative to fines. To explore how outcomes would change under a quota, I re-simulate the auctions
with the additional constraint that prime contractors must meet the quota, and for simplicity, I fix the quota
level across all simulated auctions.
Table 9 summarizes the outcomes for different quota levels. As expected, quotas lead to higher average
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Table 9: Counterfactual Quota Levels
0% Quota 5% Quota 10% Quota 15% Quota 20% Quota
DBE share (%) 8.42 10.52 13.09 16.28 20.34
Winning Bid (in 1000s) 5103.56 5172.63 5254.43 5353.97 5478.21
Project Cost (in 1000s) 4287.33 4373.41 4476.02 4601.09 4757.13
Markup Reduction (in 1000s) 96.82 113.83 134.64 160.18 191.98
DBE Cost (in 1000s) 278.71 452.30 666.72 926.48 1251.94
Non-DBE Profits (in 1000s) 816.23 799.22 778.41 752.88 721.08
Note: Average auction outcomes for different quota levels on auctions with DBE subcontracting reqirements.
shares of work completed by DBE subcontractors and become more binding at higher levels since the average
share is closer to the quota level. Similar to subcontracting requirements enforced by fines, higher quota
levels lead to higher winning bids, higher project costs, and lower non-DBE profits. Quotas appear to be
more effective than fines in increasing DBE participation, though. In fact, a uniform 5 percent quota leads to
higher DBE subcontracting shares than a 50 percent increase in all DBE subcontracting requirements (which
corresponds to an average subcontracting requirement of 6.3 percent).
7.3 Counterfactual Subsidies
As an alternative to enforcing subcontracting requirements, the NMDOT can increase DBE subcontracting
shares by subsidizing DBE utilization. To investigate how subsidies would affect NMDOT procurement
auctions, I simulate the auction outcomes under the assumption that the government subsidizes a share of
the DBE costs. That is to say, rather than facing a DBE pricing function of P (si), prime contractors now
face a subsidized pricing function of (1− sub)P (si), where sub ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the total DBE
cost paid by the government. To track the subsidy’s cost, I include Subsidy Cost and Procurement Cost as
additional outcome variables, where Subsidy Cost is the average cost of the subsidy and Procurement Cost
is the average cost of the subsidy added to the average winning bid.
Table 10 contains the results from the subsidy simulations. As is evident from the table, subsidies increase
the average share of projects awarded to DBE subcontractors but are associated with lower winning bids.
Intuitively, the subsidy makes DBE subcontractors cheaper, which encourages prime contractors to use them
to obtain lower project costs. Increased DBE subcontractor utilization also leads to lower markups, and the
combination of lower markups and lower project costs results in lower average equilibrium bids. Subsidies
also lead to lower non-DBE profits, which comes from prime contractors using more DBE subcontractors
instead of either their own resources or non-DBE subcontractors.
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Table 10: Counterfactual Subsidy Levels
0% Subsidy 5% Subsidy 10% Subsidy 15% Subsidy 20% Subsidy
DBE share (%) 8.42 9.30 10.30 11.42 12.69
Winning Bid (in 1000s) 5103.56 5079.47 5051.96 5020.46 4984.26
Project Cost (in 1000s) 4287.33 4272.35 4255.05 4235.01 4211.69
Markup Reduction (in 1000s) 96.82 105.94 116.15 127.61 140.49
DBE Cost (in 1000s) 278.71 321.52 371.88 431.18 504.16
Non-DBE Profits (in 1000s) 816.23 807.11 796.91 785.44 772.56
Subsidy Cost (in 1000s) 0 16.08 37.19 64.68 100.83
Procurement Cost (in 1000s) 5103.56 5095.54 5089.15 5085.14 5085.09
Note: Average auction outcomes for different subsidy levels on auctions with DBE subcontracting reqirements.
A more counterintuitive result with subsidies is that they produce lower average procurement costs. This
outcome is possible because subsidies are less likely to affect the most efficient19 prime contractor’s DBE
subcontracting decisions yet make every competing firm more competitive. To illustrate this point with an
example, consider a firm that is so efficient that it would never use DBE subcontractors – even with the
subsidy. If that firm wins, there would be no subsidy cost, but the firm would have to lower its markup to
compete with the other firms that can now obtain lower project costs with the subsidy.20
7.4 Comparing Quotas and Subsidies
With the set of outcomes established for different quota and subsidy levels, I now shift my analysis towards
comparing these policies. In particular, I compare outcomes under a subsidy and a quota constrained to
match the average DBE share obtained by the past subcontracting requirements. I calculate these subsidy
and quota levels by using cubic splines to interpolate the non-simulated outcomes.
Table 11: Policy Comparisons
Quota Subsidy
∆ Winning Bid (%) 0.156 -0.595
∆ DBE Cost (%) 5.187 -1.585
∆ Non-DBE Profits (%) 0.178 0.005
∆ Procurement Cost (%) 0.156 -0.375
Note: Percent change in the average auction outcomes
for policies that achieve the baseline average DBE sub-
contracting share.
Table 11 contains the policy comparisons. In general, many of the outcomes under subsidies and quotas
are similar to the outcomes with subcontracting requirements. Subsidies result in lower winning bids, higher
19Efficiency refers to a prime contractor’s non-DBE cost. A more efficient prime contractor has a lower non-DBE cost.
20I explore this result using simulations in the appendix; see Appendix D.
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non-DBE profits, and lower procurement costs relative to subcontracting requirements, but subsidies also
result in lower payments to DBE subcontractors. These results are intuitive since subsidies distort more
efficient prime contractors’ DBE subcontracting decisions less than subcontracting requirements do, and more
efficient prime contractors are more likely to win. Relative to subcontracting requirements and subsidies,
quotas lead to higher payments to DBE subcontractors because prime contractors must use the specified
share of DBEs instead of paying the fine or not using the subsidy, even if DBEs are unusually more costly.
Taken together, these results suggest that quotas are appropriate for governments aiming to increase the
amount of money given to DBE subcontractors, while subsidies are best for governments pursuing policies
with lower procurement costs.
8 Conclusion
This paper theoretically and empirically examines how subcontracting requirements affect government pro-
curement auctions. The subcontracting policy requires that prime contractors select subcontractors from a
common pool of preferred firms, leading to a shared component in their project costs. Theoretically, this
shared cost component reduces markups, and the reduction in markups can be sufficiently high to mitigate
cost increases from using more costly subcontractors.
The policy experiments illustrate the impact of subcontracting requirements on procurement in New
Mexico. I estimate that New Mexico’s past subcontracting requirements increased the money given to DBE
subcontractors by 12.7 percent, increased procurement costs by only 0.3 percent, and decreased non-DBE
profits by only 0.8 percent. These results suggest that New Mexico’s subcontracting requirements, although
effective in increasing DBE subcontractor utilization, was not responsible for large increases in procurement
costs.
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A Proofs
A.1 Properties of the Optimal DBE Subcontracting Decision
A.1.1 Second-Order Conditions
The sufficient condition on optimal DBE subcontracting is given by the following expression:
−P ′′ (si)− ϕ′′ (si; s) < 0.
Observe that this condition is satisfied by the convexity assumption on ϕ and P .
A.1.2 Comparative Statics
The concern here is in understanding how the optimal DBE subcontracting share changes with ci. Differen-
tiating equation (2) while taking into account the optimal DBE subcontracting strategy yields
1 = P ′′ (s (ci; s)) s′ (ci; s) + ϕ′′ (s (ci; s) ; s) s′ (ci; s) .
After some algebraic manipulation, the above equation reduces to
s′ (ci; s, τt) =
1
P ′′ (s (ci; s)) + ϕ′′ (s (ci; s) ; s)
,
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which is increasing given the second-order conditions.
A.2 Derivation of the Bid Function (Proposition 1)
I derive the bid function from an envelope theorem argument. In particular, the profit a bidder gains from
a non-DBE cost realization ci is
Π (ci; s) = (9)
(b (ci; s)− ci (1− s (ci; s))− P (s (ci; s))− ϕ (s (ci; s) ; s))
× (1− F (ci))N−1 .
Alternatively, if bidder i is playing a best response, it must be the case that
Π (ci; s) = max{bi,si}
(bi − ci (1− si)− P (si)− ϕ (si; s))
(
1− F (b−1 (bi)))N−1 .
Apply the envelope theorem to get21
d
dc
Π (c; s)
∣∣∣∣
c=ci
= (s (ci; s)− 1) (1− F (ci))N−1 .
Integrate the above expression to get another expression for Π (ci; s):
Π (ci; s) = Π (c; s) +
∫ c
ci
(1− st (c˜; s)) (1− F (c˜))N−1 dc˜. (10)
Given that I assume bids are increasing in project costs, it must be the case that any bidder who draws
a non-DBE cost of c cannot win with positive probability in equilibrium. Therefore, I set Π (c; s) = 0 and
equate the right hand side of equations (9) and (10) to get the optimal bid function in equation (6).
It is important to understand the shape of the bid function since there is a region where two different
draws of ci could potentially lead to the same bid. Specifically, the optimal bid function will be flat in ci
whenever s (ci; s) = 1 and increasing in ci whenever s (ci; s) ∈ [0, 1). This result is intuitive since prime
contractors who subcontract the entire project to DBE firms will have the same project cost independent of
21To invert the bid function in this step, I implicitly assume that bids are increasing in ci rather than project costs. Indeed,
bids will be increasing in ci so long as s (ci; s) < 1 using the results from equation (5), but this assumption could be problematic
if s (ci; s) = 1 since project costs are flat in ci. As a result, the following analysis only holds for s (ci; s) ∈ [0, 1), but the derived
expression for the bid function in terms of ci will also hold when s (ci; s) = 1.
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their non-DBE cost. In the data, no prime contractors subcontract the entire project to DBE firms, so the
empirical application avoids this potential theoretical problem.
A.3 Proof of Increasing DBE Subcontractor Shares (Proposition 2)
Proposition. For a given non-DBE cost draw ci, if s (ci; 0) 6= s (ci; s), then s (ci; 0) < s (ci; s).
Proof. By the first-order conditions on optimal DBE subcontracting,
ci = P
′ (si) + ϕ′ (si; s) .
Given the assumption s (ci; 0) 6= s (ci; s), it must be the case that ϕ′ (si; s) < 0. When that inequality
holds, prime contractors find it optimal to increase their DBE shares si when there is a DBE subcontracting
requirement. There are now three possible cases for s (ci; 0) and s (ci; s)
22: both solutions are interior
solutions, one of the two solutions is an interior solution while the other is a corner solution, or both solutions
occur at different corners. In either of these three cases s (ci; 0) < s (ci; s).
A.4 Proof of Weakly Higher Project Costs (Corollary 1)
Corollary. DBE subcontracting requirements weakly raise project costs.
Proof. Suppose bidder i wins an auction with a bid of b. Without subcontracting requirements, he would
choose shares, s (ci; 0), such that
s (ci; 0) ∈ arg max
si
{b− ci (1− si)− P (si)} ,
or analogously,
s (ci; 0) ∈ arg min
si
{ci (1− si) + P (si)} .
Define C (si; 0) = ci (1− si)+P (si) as the project cost of bidder i when there are no DBE subcontracting
requirements, and consider the optimal share with subcontracting requirements, s (ci; s). Since s (ci; 0) is
the minimizer of C (·; 0), C (s (ci; 0) ; 0) ≤ C (s (ci; s) ; 0). Since fines are non-negative, C (s (ci; s) ; 0) ≤
C (s (ci; s) ; 0) + ϕ (s (ci; s) ; s) = φ (ci; s).
22Since prime contractors find it optimal to increase the share when there is a requirement, any case where s (ci; 0) > s (ci; s)
is not possible. The assumption that s (ci; 0) 6= s (ci; s) rules out the cases where both solutions occur at the same corner.
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A.5 Proof of Weakly Lower Markups (Corollary 2)
Corollary. DBE subcontracting requirements weakly lower markups.
Proof. Proposition 2 implies that s (ci; 0) ≤ s (ci; s) for all non-DBE costs, ci. Therefore, markups are weakly
lower with DBE subcontracting requirements since
∫ c
ci
(1− s (c˜; s)) (1− F (c˜))N−1 dc˜ ≤
∫ c
ci
(1− s (c˜; 0)) (1− F (c˜))N−1 dc˜.
B Estimation Appendix
In order to maintain desirable properties of the model across different parameter guesses, I must restrict
the model’s set of possible parameter values. I include these restrictions along with details on the optimal
weighting matrix and asymptotic standard errors in this appendix.
B.1 Parametric Restrictions
I restrict the parameters so that the pricing function is convex and increasing in the DBE share and the
fine function is convex and non-increasing in the share. To illustrate these restrictions, consider the first and
second-order conditions of the DBE pricing function and the fine function for any given auction:
P ′ (si) =
(
α0 + α1si + α2
si
1− si + α
′
3zw + uw
)
xˆw +
(
α1 +
α2
(1− si)2
)
sixˆw
ϕ′ (si; s) =

2γ (si − s) xˆ if si < s
0 if si ≥ s
P ′′ (si) = 2
(
α1 +
α2
(1− si)2
)
xˆw +
(
2α2
(1− si)3
)
sixˆw
ϕ′′ (si; s) =

2γxˆ if si < s
0 if si ≥ s
.
Observe that restricting α0 > 0, α1 > 0, α2 > 0 and α3 > 0 will generate a DBE pricing function that
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is convex and increasing in the DBE share for si ∈ [0, 1). Similarly, restricting γ > 0 will produce a fine
function that is convex and non-increasing for si ∈ [0, 1]. In estimation, I restrict the structural parameter
values to the aforementioned range of possible values to maintain those properties across parameter guesses.
B.2 Standard Errors and Optimal Weighting Matrix
Following Gourieroux et al. (1993), the asymptotic distribution of the indirect inference estimator takes the
following form:
√
W
(
θˆHW − θ0
)
d−→ N (0, Vθ)
with
Vθ =
(
1 +
1
H
)
(D′ΩD)−1D′ΩVβ0ΩD (D
′ΩD)−1 ,
D =
∂β0
∂θ′0
,
and
√
W
(
β˜HW − β0
)
d−→ N (0, Vβ0) .
Notation wise, θˆHW are the structural parameters estimated from the data, θ0 are the true structural
parameters, Ω is a positive definite weighting matrix, β0 are the auxiliary parameters evaluated using the
true structural parameters, and
d−→ denotes convergence in distribution. The optimal weight matrix in this
setting is Ω? = (Vβ0)
−1
, yielding an asymptotic variance of Vθ =
(
1 + 1H
)
(D′Ω?D)−1.
In practice, I replace the objects of the asymptotic distribution by consistent estimators. Specifically, I
use the following consistent estimators in place of their asymptotic counterparts:
Dˆ =
∂βHW
(
θˆHW
)
∂θˆ′HW
and
Ωˆ? =
(
VˆβHW (θˆHW )
)−1
.
In constructing VˆβHW (θˆHW ), the estimator for Vβ0 , I use a parametric bootstrap procedure.
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C Estimated Pricing and Fine Functions
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Figure 3: The DBE Pricing Function as a Fraction of the Engineer’s Estimate
Note: This figure shows a plot of the price of using DBE subcontractors as a fraction of the engineer’s estimate,
which corresponds to the expression P (si)
xˆ
. Here, the pricing function is evaluated using the mean level of subprojects
in the DBE-eligible data and the mean level of the unobservable pricing shock term (σu) when there is an established
DBE subcontracting requirement of 7.5 percent.
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Figure 4: Fine Function as a Fraction of the Engineer’s Estimate
Note: This figure shows the estimated fine function as a fraction of the engineer’s estimate, corresponding to the
expression ϕ(si;s)
xˆ
. The fine function is evaluated when there is an established DBE subcontracting requirement of 7.5
percent.
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D Subsidy and Quota Simulations
In this section, I repeat the numerical simulations with quotas and subsidies. I maintain the environment
and functional form assumptions from section 4; for completeness, I list those assumptions below:
• N = 2
• ci ∼ U [0, 1], where U [·, ·] denotes the uniform distribution.
• P (si) = ξs
2
i
2
• ϕ (si; s) =

λ(si−s)2
2 if si < s
0, if si ≥ s
• ξ = 2, λ = 3
I set the quota and subsidy to 30% to match the simulations with subcontracting requirements.
Figure 5 shows the DBE subcontracting functions when there is a quota (the left panel) and subsidy
(the right panel) and compares them to the subcontracting functions when there is no policy. For quotas,
the DBE subcontracting functions are flat at the quota share if prime contractors would have subcontracted
below the quota and match the non-quota DBE subcontracting functions otherwise. This shape comes
from the constraint that prime contractors must meet the quota. For subsidies, the DBE subcontracting
function is a rotation of the unsubsidized DBE subcontracting function. This shape is intuitive: prime
contractors with lower non-DBE costs are less likely to use DBE subcontractors when they are subsidized.
An important difference between subsidies and subcontracting requirements is that subsidies distort the more
efficient contractors’ subcontracting decisions less, while subcontracting requirements distort the less efficient
contractors’ subcontracting decisions more.
Next, I simulate the bid functions, which are displayed in figure 6. The bid function under the quota is
similar to the bid function under subcontracting requirements, but the bids are relatively higher for prime
contractors with lower non-DBE costs. This property comes from prime contractors losing the option to pay
a fine instead of using DBE subcontractors, which leads to higher project costs.
The bid function under the subsidy is visibly lower than the bid function under subcontracting require-
ments. This effect is intensified for prime contractors with high non-DBE costs. Intuitively, DBE subcon-
tractors are cheaper with the subsidy, which leads to lower project costs. Since prime contractors use more
DBE subcontractors with a subsidy, their markups are also lower, leading to lower equilibrium bids.
42
non-DBE cost (ci)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
D
BE
 s
ha
re
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
With Quota
Without Quota
non-DBE cost (ci)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
D
BE
 s
ha
re
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
With Subsidy
Without Subsidy
Figure 5: DBE Share Functions with Quotas and Subsidies
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Figure 6: Bid Functions with Quotas and Subsidies
My last simulation shows how procurement costs change with the subsidy; this simulation is contained in
figure 7. Interestingly, procurement costs for prime contractors with low non-DBE costs are lower with the
subsidy, and the reverse is true for prime contractors with high non-DBE costs. The idea behind this result
is that prime contractors with low non-DBE costs are less likely to use the subsidy but still bid lower than
the unsubsidized case, leading to lower procurement costs.
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Figure 7: Procurement Cost with Subsidies
E Invitation for Bids
I gather the majority of the observable variables from the invitation for bids document that the NMDOT
publishes to advertise its available construction projects. Figure 8 contains an excerpt from the NMDOT’s
January 22nd, 2010 advertisement. The first paragraph specifies the county, which is later aggregated up to
administrative district, and length. The second paragraph lists the project’s components. In my empirical
analysis, I take the component in uppercase letters (in this case, roadway rehabilitation) as the main project,
and I take the following components as the subprojects. The third paragraph gives the working days, and the
fourth paragraph states whether there is a DBE subcontracting requirement (or goal). The last paragraph
gives the licensing requirements.
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Figure 8: IFB Example
F Additional Regressions and Graphs
Note: This figure shows the distribution of non-zero DBE subcontracting requirements.
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Note: This figure shows the percentage difference between the share of DBE subcontractors actually used on a given
project and the DBE subcontracting requirement conditional on the project having a subcontracting requirement.
Although there is some bunching at 0 percent, there is a non-trivial mass of projects where contractors exceed the
subcontracting requirement by more than 1 percent. Consequently, a continuous function is used to approximate the
change in incentives induced by having a DBE subcontracting requirement rather than a discrete function. This figure
is truncated at 15 percent for visual clarity.
Tables 12 and 13 motivate the main modeling assumptions of the paper. Table 12 contains a regression
specification very similar to the first three columns of tables 2 and 3, but I include a control for firm capacity
(as measured by the project backlog of a firm divided by the maximum backlog of the firm during the sample
period) as an additional observable. This regression motivates the absence of capacity constraints in my
paper’s main analysis; the statistically insignificant coefficient on the capacity measure shows that there is
insufficient descriptive evidence in favor of including firm capacity in firm bidding and DBE subcontracting
decisions. Similarly, table 13 is a regression that explores firm entry decisions as measured by the number of
planholders and the fraction of bidders over the number of planholders. Although entry is typically modeled
as an endogenous decision in these types of procurement models, the lack of an economically and statistically
significant coefficient on the DBE requirement variable suggests that entry is not a first-order concern in
evaluating these DBE participation policies.
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Table 12: Capacity Regressions
Dependent variable:
log(Winning Bid) DBE Share (%)
(1) (2)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.927∗∗∗ −0.352
(0.017) (0.624)
DBE Req (%) 0.002 1.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.184)
log(Length + 1) 0.043∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.014) (0.511)
Capacity −0.019 −0.355
(0.040) (1.161)
log(Planholders) 0.007 1.610
(0.056) (1.940)
log(Subprojects) 0.049∗ 1.432
(0.028) (0.880)
Number of Licenses Required 0.044∗∗ 1.773∗
(0.020) (0.924)
log(Working Days) 0.038∗ −0.613
(0.020) (0.605)
Bidders −0.018∗∗∗ −0.058
(0.005) (0.215)
Federal Highway −0.034 −0.240
(0.022) (0.690)
Urban −0.018 1.899∗
(0.034) (0.970)
Observations 389 389
Adjusted R2 0.985 0.227
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Regression includes controls for district and type of
work as well as month and year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are robust.
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Table 13: Entry Regressions
Dependent variable:
Bidders/Planholders Planholders
(1) (2)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.008 1.392∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.353)
DBE Req (%) 0.0005 0.105
(0.002) (0.087)
log(Length + 1) 0.010 −1.239∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.314)
log(Subprojects) −0.001 3.417∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.589)
Number of Licenses Required −0.022∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.457)
log(Working Days) −0.018∗ 1.554∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.408)
Federal Highway 0.001 −0.543
(0.011) (0.429)
Urban 0.002 1.522∗∗
(0.016) (0.619)
Observations 389 389
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.708
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Regression includes controls for district and type of
work as well as month and year fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors are robust.
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